On July 10, local time, Ukrainian President Zelensky announced the establishment of a special “long-range strike” command in the military to step up long-range attacks against Russia. In recent months, the Ukrainian military has continued to expand the scale and frequency of drone attacks, violently attacking Russia's important energy and logistics facilities, with the intention of “leading the flames of war to Russia” and weakening the opponent's combat capability. Due to drone attacks, many parts of Russia have recently experienced fuel shortages and supply difficulties, and temporary restrictions on the take-off and landing of civilian aircraft have caused many flight delays. Statistics from the Russian Ministry of Defense show that in a week from July 6 to July 12, Russian air defense forces intercepted and destroyed at least 4,830 Ukrainian drones over Russia. Among them, the largest number of drones were shot down on July 8 and 10, 903 and 821, respectively. The previous week, at least 3,945 drones were intercepted. As an important means of attack in 21st century conflicts, drone warfare has profoundly changed military strategy, equipment procurement, and battlefield dynamics. On the one hand, there are astonishing interception numbers, and on the other, the effectiveness of the continuous and deepening crackdown. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon reveals exactly the core of the problem: modern air defense systems are not “unable to stop” drones, but are unable to stop enough drones in a sustainable way. This is not a technical failure of a system, but a structural misalignment of attack and defense logic. Ukraine makes extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf components or simple workshop-style suicide drones, which cost only hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars per unit. And every time Russia intercepts such a drone, it often consumes an anti-aircraft missile worth hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. When Russia launches an “armor” interceptor missile worth 300,000 dollars to shoot down a drone worth 50,000 dollars, it is equivalent to spending 6 dollars to save 1 dollar. Theoretically speaking, Russia is indeed capable of shooting down the vast majority of incoming drones. However, in reality, the vast majority is not equal to “all,” and the small part that “slips through the net” is enough to cause significant damage. The deeper dilemma is that air defense is a “passive response” act, and its effectiveness is naturally limited by the pace and scale of the attackers. Defenders can continuously increase their interception rate, but as long as the attackers continue to expand their launch scale, reduce unit costs, and innovate surprise defense methods, the defenders will always be in a “catch up” state.
Zhitongcaijing · 2d ago
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On July 10, local time, Ukrainian President Zelensky announced the establishment of a special “long-range strike” command in the military to step up long-range attacks against Russia. In recent months, the Ukrainian military has continued to expand the scale and frequency of drone attacks, violently attacking Russia's important energy and logistics facilities, with the intention of “leading the flames of war to Russia” and weakening the opponent's combat capability. Due to drone attacks, many parts of Russia have recently experienced fuel shortages and supply difficulties, and temporary restrictions on the take-off and landing of civilian aircraft have caused many flight delays. Statistics from the Russian Ministry of Defense show that in a week from July 6 to July 12, Russian air defense forces intercepted and destroyed at least 4,830 Ukrainian drones over Russia. Among them, the largest number of drones were shot down on July 8 and 10, 903 and 821, respectively. The previous week, at least 3,945 drones were intercepted. As an important means of attack in 21st century conflicts, drone warfare has profoundly changed military strategy, equipment procurement, and battlefield dynamics. On the one hand, there are astonishing interception numbers, and on the other, the effectiveness of the continuous and deepening crackdown. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon reveals exactly the core of the problem: modern air defense systems are not “unable to stop” drones, but are unable to stop enough drones in a sustainable way. This is not a technical failure of a system, but a structural misalignment of attack and defense logic. Ukraine makes extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf components or simple workshop-style suicide drones, which cost only hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars per unit. And every time Russia intercepts such a drone, it often consumes an anti-aircraft missile worth hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. When Russia launches an “armor” interceptor missile worth 300,000 dollars to shoot down a drone worth 50,000 dollars, it is equivalent to spending 6 dollars to save 1 dollar. Theoretically speaking, Russia is indeed capable of shooting down the vast majority of incoming drones. However, in reality, the vast majority is not equal to “all,” and the small part that “slips through the net” is enough to cause significant damage. The deeper dilemma is that air defense is a “passive response” act, and its effectiveness is naturally limited by the pace and scale of the attackers. Defenders can continuously increase their interception rate, but as long as the attackers continue to expand their launch scale, reduce unit costs, and innovate surprise defense methods, the defenders will always be in a “catch up” state.
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