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On the 28th local time, recordings of key dispatch calls from the massive high-speed rail rear-end accident in Toledo province of Spain came to light. According to reports, these three core call recordings include two calls between the control center and the ILYO train driver parked in the tracks, and a call with the Spanish National Railways train driver rear-facing. These recordings confirm key operational errors before the accident occurred. The recording shows that prior to the incident, the operator of the 24-hour dispatch and control center in Atocha, Madrid, issued clear instructions to the Spanish National Railways train, which is about 25 kilometers from the Iljo train: “Disconnect, reconnect, and return to normal speed.” According to reports, this directive directly violates relevant safety regulations. The regulations require that in the area of system failure, trains should visually drive at a speed limit of 40 km/h or at a speed limit of 40 km/h. Furthermore, without confirming that the front train had left the section safely, the dispatcher allowed the rear train to advance at full speed, which eventually led to a tragedy.
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On the 28th local time, recordings of key dispatch calls from the massive high-speed rail rear-end accident in Toledo province of Spain came to light. According to reports, these three core call recordings include two calls between the control center and the ILYO train driver parked in the tracks, and a call with the Spanish National Railways train driver rear-facing. These recordings confirm key operational errors before the accident occurred. The recording shows that prior to the incident, the operator of the 24-hour dispatch and control center in Atocha, Madrid, issued clear instructions to the Spanish National Railways train, which is about 25 kilometers from the Iljo train: “Disconnect, reconnect, and return to normal speed.” According to reports, this directive directly violates relevant safety regulations. The regulations require that in the area of system failure, trains should visually drive at a speed limit of 40 km/h or at a speed limit of 40 km/h. Furthermore, without confirming that the front train had left the section safely, the dispatcher allowed the rear train to advance at full speed, which eventually led to a tragedy.
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