
The Zhitong Finance App learned that CITIC Construction Investment released a research report saying that with relatively limited room for real interest rates to rise and the central bank backing up money purchases, the gold price center is expected to fluctuate upward. The current rise in real interest rates is the core of suppressing gold prices. Looking ahead to 2027, the US economy is showing K-type differentiation, the high oil price base will weaken the energy drive to inflation, and the market has fully calculated expectations of interest rate hikes in 2027, compounded by the rigid constraints of US fiscal interest payment pressure. It is expected that there is relatively limited room for further upward growth in real interest rates, and the pressure on gold prices is expected to gradually ease. At the same time, diversification of global reserves drives the continuation of the central bank's medium- to long-term gold purchase trend, forming a stable acceptance when gold prices recoil, and continuing to raise the bottom of the gold price. Although it is difficult to drive the unilateral trend to rise sharply, it will work with real interest rates that tend to ease to support the fluctuation and upward trend in the gold price center.
CITIC Construction Investment's main views are as follows:
Market recovery: gold prices are under pressure, with a cumulative decline of about 10%
After two consecutive years of increase from 2024 to 2025, the price of gold ushered in its first substantial adjustment in 2026. Gold prices rose 27% and 63% respectively in 2024 and 2025, respectively. In January 2026, London gold now soared to 5,599 US dollars/ounce, then continued to decline. As of October 30, London gold now has a cumulative decline of 10.41% in 2026, with a maximum retracement of about 31% during the period.
1) January-February: Geographic hedging and interest rate cut expectations resonated with the central bank's gold purchase, driving gold prices to new highs; the Walsh nomination then triggered hawkish expectations, and the profit market was crushed, and the price of gold fell.
2) February-March: When the US-Iran conflict broke out in February, safe-haven transactions heated up, and gold prices were repaired, but as oil prices soared, inflation concerns and interest rate hike transactions heated up, gold prices fell again.
3) April-July: The US-Iran conflict eased in April, and the price of gold stopped falling and rebounding, but in May the non-agricultural sector and CPI exceeded expectations. The June bitmap showed that 9 people supported interest rate hikes, compounded by the diversion of funds from the AI sector, and the price of gold fell. Technology stocks were adjusted in July, the intensity of the US-Iran conflict declined, inflationary pressure declined, and the combined economic data fell short of expectations, and gold prices bottomed out.
4) August-October: Economic data for August fell short of expectations. Expectations of interest rate hikes cooled down. Combined with the Treasury's repurchase of US bonds, the repurchase of US bonds raised market concerns about the US dollar's sovereign credit, and the price of gold rebounded. Since then, as the Federal Reserve implemented an interest rate hike in September and oil prices remained high, the price of gold weakened again. Entering October, a correction in the equity market triggered a liquidity squeeze. Gold was sold off, and the price of gold fell to a low point during the year.
Real interest rate: the core factor suppressing the price of gold, it is expected that future upward space is relatively limited
The central bank's margin for gold purchases weakened in 2026, and the rise in real interest rates became the core factor suppressing the price of gold. Since 2022, the scale of gold purchases by central banks around the world has risen markedly. At one point, it became the main force in marginal demand for gold, and the share of demand increased from 11% to 23%; central bank purchases hedged the suppression of gold prices by rising real interest rates to a certain extent, and gold prices were “decoupled” from 2022 to 2024. However, the central bank will also consider the purchase cost. Gold prices in 2025 and 2026 are at historically high levels, and some central banks are slowing down the pace of gold purchases in stages. Although the long-term trend of central bank holdings growth has not changed, marginal purchasing power has weakened, making it difficult to fully hedge against the impact of interest rate fluctuations. As a result, the rise in real interest rates in 2026 became the core force suppressing the price of gold, while the central bank's purchase of gold declined to support the bottom of the gold price.
The rise in real interest rates in 2026 is mainly due to four points: 1) the Federal Reserve's policy shift, which switched from interest rate cuts to interest rate hikes, and the bitmap was revised simultaneously during the same period; 2) the US-Iran conflict pushed up oil prices and led to an increase in inflation, but long-term inflation expectations did not rise significantly, and the vast majority of the increase in nominal interest rates translated into an upward trend in real interest rates; 3) The AI industry's capital expenditure supported continued expansion, boosting the market's pricing on the neutral interest rate center; 4) The high US fiscal deficit compounded the upward pressure on US debt supply and supply The actual period premium increased.
It is expected that real interest rates will have relatively limited room to rise further in 2027. The core logic is as follows: 1) The US economy shows a K-shaped pattern of differentiation and lacks a fundamental basis for sustained and drastic interest rate hikes; 2) the high oil price operation in 2026 forms a high base effect, and its marginal driving effect on inflation is expected to weaken in 2027, and inflation is expected to decline throughout the year; 3) The market has fully set the expectations of interest rate increases in 2027; 4) The US fiscal interest payment pressure forms a hard constraint, which will limit the extent to which real interest rates rise.
Currently, the US economy is showing K-type differentiation, and there is no basis for large-scale interest rate hikes. Although total data such as GDP and employment continue to show resilience beyond expectations, internal structural differentiation is remarkable: the technology sector is booming, and the traditional sector is weakening. Looking ahead to 2027, the AI capital expenditure cycle continues, and the economy is expected to maintain moderate growth, but high interest rates will suppress consumer consumption and at the same time place strong restrictions on manufacturing and SME financing, so the US lacks fundamental support for large-scale interest rate hikes.
The driving effect of oil prices on inflation is expected to weaken in 2027, and the center of inflation is expected to decline. As of October 30, 2026, oil prices have risen to 104 US dollars/barrel. Looking ahead to 2027, there is still uncertainty about the geographical risks in the Middle East, but oil prices are already at historically high levels, and there is limited room for further upward movement. Even if oil prices remain high and fluctuate, the high base formed in 2026 will weaken the energy segment's year-on-year drive to CPI and drive nominal inflation back down. However, the oil price base was low in early 2026. It is expected that the pace of inflation in 2027 will probably be high and low, and the central trend will trend downward throughout the year.
Judging from quantitative estimates, historical experience shows that every 10% change in oil prices corresponds to a year-on-year change in CPI of about 0.2 percentage points. Assuming that the CPI center after excluding energy items was 2.6%, and five oil price scenarios of 70/90/110/130/180 US dollars/barrel were set to be calculated. The results showed that as long as oil prices did not rise sharply, overall inflation would trend downward in 2027.
Fiscal interest payment restrictions will limit the room for real interest rates to rise. The US public debt stock is high, and the current real interest rate remains high. The share of federal net interest expenditure in GDP in 2025 has surpassed defense spending, and the pressure on fiscal interest payments is clearly prominent. US stock debt is being renewed on a large scale and at a rapid pace. The impact of rising interest rates on fiscal costs is characterized by lag and accumulation: if real interest rates continue to rise, after stock bonds expire and be replaced one after another, the interest cost of the overall debt portfolio will rise, interest expenses will further squeeze fiscal policy space, and fiscal sustainability constraints will increase accordingly, thereby limiting the upward height of real interest rates.
The market has fully priced the 2027 rate hike expectations. The FOMC bitmap for September 2026 shows that interest rates are expected to be raised once more in 2026, and the policy interest rate will rise to 4.00%-4.25%; in 2027, members' expectations are clearly divided: 8 people support another increase to 4.25%-4.5%, 6 people keep interest rates unchanged, and 4 predict interest rate cuts. Overall, 2028 is expected to enter a cycle of interest rate cuts. However, the current pricing terminal interest rate for CME interest rate futures is 4.5%-4.75%, implying two interest rate hikes in 2027. Expectations of interest rate hikes are fully reflected in asset prices. Judging from the rules of gold price trading, the stage with the greatest pressure on gold prices is the process where market expectations shift from interest rate cuts to interest rate hikes; once interest rate hikes are expected to be priced ahead of schedule, interest rate hikes are often implemented in a negative way, which in turn supports the price of gold.
Financial side: Increased fluctuations in transaction capital, backed by the central bank's purchase funds
Trading capital: Follow the rotation of gold prices and interest rate expectations
The flow of global gold ETF funds in 2026 will basically follow fluctuations in gold prices. Capital was concentrated in January, and Asian capital was the main purchasing force, corresponding to the rise in gold prices to a high point during the year; from March to June, capital outflows were repeated, and selling pressure was prominent in North America. Overall, there was only a slight net inflow in the first half of the year. Capital returned on a large scale from July to September. The inflow volume in the third quarter reached a record high in a single quarter. Purchases became dominated by capital from Europe and the US, and Asia maintained steady inflows; in terms of regional structure, incremental capital mainly came from Asia in the first half of the year, and Europe and the US continued to flow out; Europe and the US became the main purchasing force in the third quarter, and Asia maintained a moderate inflow. There was another net ETF outflow in late October, and SPDR holdings declined somewhat, but overall holdings remained high throughout the year.
The overall volatility of gold options in 2026 is high. The average implied volatility throughout the year was at a historically high level, but the pace was clearly divided: two rounds of surges in the first quarter, reflecting the risk of gold prices peaking ahead of time; geographical conflict eased in the second quarter, and volatility fell rapidly with risk premiums; market panic cooled markedly in the third quarter, implied that volatility continued to be low; and the liquidity shock in October led to a rapid rebound in volatility in a single day. Looking at COMEX's net non-commercial position, net long positions in January hit a full-year high. After hawkish expectations were implemented, capital was concentrated on reducing positions in February; positions increased again in the third quarter along with a rebound in gold prices, and continued to drop in mid-October.
Central Bank Gold Purchases: Expected to continue purchasing in 2027, steadily increasing the gold price center
Central bank purchases have formed a medium- to long-term trend, and demand is expected to remain high. In recent years, the US dollar has continued to overrun, and the share of US debt in GDP has continued to rise. After the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, the US removed Russia from the SWIFT settlement system, strengthening the demand of non-US economies to diversify reserve currency and asset allocation, and the global de-dollarization process has further accelerated. Gold does not rely on the credit of a single country. It is a borderless value carrier with “decentralized” characteristics. Its value consensus has been verified for thousands of years, so it has become an important tool for central banks to promote diversification of reserve assets and hedge against geopolitical risks. From 2010 to 2021, the average annual net purchase amount of global central banks was about 473 tons; in 2024, the average annual net purchase price rose to 1,072 tons, exceeding 1,000 tons for three consecutive years; in 2025, the amount of gold purchased fell back to 850 tons, and the cumulative global net purchase amount for the first three quarters of 2026 was 675 tons.
A total of 43 countries and regions increased their gold holdings in the first three quarters of 2026. Among them, Poland purchased the largest amount of gold. The Central Bank of China has been increasing its holdings for 23 consecutive months, with a cumulative increase of 103.26 tons in the first three quarters. Economies such as the Czech Republic, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Jordan also continued to allocate. Although some central banks sold gold in 2026, most of them were economies facing fiscal pressure or exchange rate pressure: Russia reduced its holdings due to financial needs to supplement military spending, Turkey adjusted its liquidity to stabilize the local currency, and the Azerbaijan Sovereign Fund rebalanced its assets by reaching the upper limit of gold allocation. The reason for the above reduction in holdings is clear and relatively predictable. It will only disrupt monthly data in the short term, and the general direction of the central bank's continued net purchase funds has not changed.
Looking ahead to 2027, the global central bank's gold buying trend is expected to continue, and its role in the market will be reflected more as a bottom support for prices than a driving force for the trend:
1) Looking at the central bank survey: According to the WGC 2026 survey, out of 74 central banks that responded, 89% of respondents expect global central bank gold reserves to continue to increase in the next 12 months, and 45% plan to increase their holdings in the next year. Both hit new highs since the 2018 survey began.
2) Looking at the ratio of gold to foreign exchange reserves: After 2022, the “accessibility” of reserves became an independent risk for the first time. Combined with the continued rise in global debt levels and the deterioration in the financial situation of major economies, gold received attention from central banks as an asset to hedge against sovereign credit risk. According to the latest data from the World Gold Council, the world's central banks account for about 26% of gold reserves, and the share of emerging market countries is still low. Against the backdrop of diversification of global foreign exchange reserves, it is expected that central banks will continue to buy funds.
3) By country:
China: According to statistics from the World Gold Council, as of the end of September 2026, China's gold reserves were 2,410 tons, corresponding to a market value of about US$323.5 billion (4,175 US dollars/ounce). Gold accounts for about 8.5% of official reserves, with total implied official reserves of about US$3.79 trillion. If the price of gold remains the same as the total amount of official reserves, the share of China's gold reserves rises to 15%, and about 1,800 tons of gold will still need to be purchased; based on the annual purchase of 150 tons, it will still be necessary to continue purchasing for more than 10 years.
Poland: The National Bank of Poland announced on November 5, 2026 that gold reserves have reached the strategic target of 700 tons, accounting for about 31% of official reserves. However, Governor Grapinsky said “I can't see any reason to stop buying gold,” and argues that gold reserves grow at the same time as overall reserves, indicating that its gold purchase logic has changed from “completing quantitative goals” to a continuous allocation “linked to total reserves.”
Czech Republic: Gold holdings have been increased for 43 consecutive months. The current holding volume is 87 tons, and the official target is to reach 100 tons by 2028.
South Korea: In August 2026, the Bank of Korea announced the restart of physical gold purchases, the first time since 2013. Although the volume of a single purchase is limited, the signal is far more significant than the quantity itself: central banks in advanced economies are also increasing their share of gold reserves to cope with changes in the global monetary system and geographical landscape. This shows that the central bank's purchase of funds is no longer an option for individual economies; it is evolving into a cross-camp reserve allocation trend.
Central bank purchases act more as “bottom pricers” rather than “market-oriented pricers.” The central bank's purchase of funds is based on reserve allocation, but the practical level is not entirely price insensitive, and the buying pace will still refer to the gold price level. As can be seen from reviewing the pace of gold purchases in each quarter of 2026, the gold price pullback phase often corresponds to an accelerated entry of marginal purchases, and the purchasing behavior showed obvious reverse price characteristics. Therefore, the central bank's role in buying gold is clear: on the one hand, when gold prices are back, the central bank is the most stable bearing force, which can effectively reduce the downward space for gold prices, raise the bottom, and reduce the risk at the end of the downside; on the other hand, the central bank's net metal purchase is linear and cumulative. It only pushes the center of gravity of gold prices to rise slowly, making it difficult to drive a trend increase.
Dollar Credit: Global De-dollarization Trend Continues
The size of US debt continues to expand, and the credit of US dollar assets is under pressure. According to estimates by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the OBBBA bill will boost the US fiscal deficit and debt burden. It is expected that the share of federal debt held by the public in GDP will rise to 120% in 2036, and concerns about sovereign credit will increase accordingly. At the same time, the expansion of the supply of long-term treasury bonds may raise long-term interest rates through supply and demand and maturity premiums, push up interest payment costs, and further weaken the credit base of US bonds and US dollar assets.
The trend of diversification of global foreign exchange reserves continues. According to IMF data, the share of the US dollar in global foreign exchange reserves fell to 56.70% in the second quarter of 2026, down 0.48 percentage points from 57.18% in the first quarter, and the euro rose to 20.60%. The exchange rate fluctuation range of major currencies during the quarter was roughly within ± 2%, and the exchange rate valuation effect was limited, indicating that this was mainly active allocation rather than valuation effect.
The marginal weakening of dollar credit and increased global financial volatility have boosted the demand for gold allocation in the private sector in emerging markets. There is likely to be a structural shift in the asset allocation behavior of the private sector in emerging markets. After obtaining trade surpluses with Western countries, it may reduce its dependence on traditional dollar assets such as US bonds and increase diversified assets. As a non-sovereign, highly liquid “quasi-currency” asset, gold's appeal has increased markedly. In particular, the share of gold allocated as a store of value and risk hedging is expected to continue to rise under the long-term trend of restructuring the financial order caused by the tariff game, increasing global market fluctuations, and weakening the credibility of the US government.
Gold stocks: The trough is gradually passing, and results can be expected
Safety regulations disrupt 2026 production, and 2027 is expected to usher in a recovery in production. Driven by individual safety incidents in 2026, domestic mines began industry-wide safety self-inspections, and industry safety supervision became stricter. Some key mining projects were stopped and overhauled in line with special regional production safety inspections, dragging down domestic gold raw material production. Raw material production in the first three quarters was 221 tons, down 18.71% year on year. Looking ahead to 2027, the gold sector is expected to see a recovery in production. The increase mainly comes from three aspects: 1) safe production limits in 2026 to form a low base; 2) the shutdown and rectification of mines to resume production one after another; 3) the gradual commissioning of new construction and technical improvement projects to release production capacity.
The valuation is relatively low, and it is expected that it will be repaired. Looking at the valuation dimension, the current valuation of the domestic gold stock sector has been in a low position for the past three years. After the sector's valuation soared in early 2026, valuations continued to be digested as gold prices recovered and production cuts were suppressing performance due to safety compliance. As of now, sector PE (TTM) has fallen back to its low level since 2023. Looking ahead to 2027, with the resumption of production of existing mines and the centralized commissioning of new projects, the valuation is expected to usher in restoration.
Investment evaluations and recommendations
The core contradiction that suppressed gold prices in 2026 comes from rising real interest rates. Looking ahead to 2027, there is limited room for real interest rates to rise further. Combined with expectations of this round of interest rate hikes, the market has fully set prices. At the same time, continued gold purchases by global central banks will form acceptance and build bottom support during the gold price pullback phase. It is expected that gold prices will fluctuate and rise in 2027. On the risk side, the US-Iran geopolitical conflict boosts oil prices, which in turn disrupts inflation, and is still the main risk variable in 2027, but it is expected that the impact of this factor on gold prices will weaken marginally. In terms of gold stocks, the 2026 industry safety rectification brought phased pressure on production. Discontinued mines are expected to resume production in 2027, and production is expected to be repaired and released. The current sector's valuation safety margin is sufficient. If the gold price center rises, the gold sector is expected to usher in a double-hit market of performance and valuation. It is recommended to prioritize targets with strong certainty in production growth, steady cost control, resource endowments and high-quality corporate governance.
Risk Alerts
1. The AI bubble has raised concerns about global economic growth. Hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in AI are seen as the key to driving economic transformation and growth. If AI fails to deliver on investment returns, it will cause a bubble or even burst, which will damage confidence in economic growth.
2. Due to the fall in aluminum prices, the forward start of production fell short of expectations. The shift to excess electrolytic aluminum lowers long-term aluminum prices. If the price of aluminum falls to 18,000 yuan/ton, which clearly lengthens the return on investment cycle, the long-term production plan may be put on hold, the long-term production will fall short of expectations, and the excess situation will be reduced or even balanced.
3. There is a risk that domestic supply will decrease. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, domestic production of electrolytic aluminum in September 2026 was 3.908 million tons, with an annual operating capacity of 47.45 million tons, exceeding the production capacity ceiling, indicating the existence of overproduction. If policies are tightened and overproduction is ordered to be withdrawn, it will cause a rigid contraction in supply, and the impact will cause prices to rise.
4. Consumption fluctuated greatly, leading to major deviations in the balance between supply and demand. AI technology is evolving rapidly. If robot applications are rapidly deployed in production and life scenarios, they will provide new demand for aluminum and may break the balance of benchmarks. According to data from the Advanced Robotics Research Institute (GGII), the amount of aluminum used in a single humanoid robot is 20-25 kg. When the number of humanoid robots exceeds 10 million, it will drive demand for 200,000 tons of aluminum.
5. The US copper-232 investigation is on hold. On February 25, 2025, US President Trump signed an executive order to investigate “whether imported copper and copper products threaten national security”. On July 30, 2025, the US Department of Commerce was requested to submit an updated assessment on “whether to include refined copper in the 232 tax” by June 30, 2026, with the aim of deciding whether to impose 15% and 30% tariffs on refined copper from January 2027 and January 2028. If tariffs come into effect or fall, copper will not continue to be moved to the US, which in turn will cause non-US regions to independently digest and refine excess copper, putting pressure on copper prices.
6. The supply of copper ore fell far short of expectations, driving prices to a sharp upward shift. The production disturbance rate of global copper mines has remained high in the past few years, as reflected in delays in new payments, accidents in production mines, and declining ore quality. If disruptions in copper production increase again in 2027-2029, there is no guarantee that 500,000 to 700,000 tons of additional copper ore will be realized, and lack of supply will drive up prices.
7. The war in the Middle East continues, and high oil prices trigger the risk of a global recession. If the Middle East conflict continues, there is a risk that crude oil prices will get out of control. Inflation will push up risk-free interest rates, exacerbate the contradiction between AI investment and returns, thereby weakening global economic growth and even triggering the risk of economic recession. Downstream consumption, copper prices, and gold prices will be severely impacted.
8. Macro interest rates and monetary policy risks. If the Federal Reserve's policy path is clearly hawkish, the rise in TIPS yields will drive a correction in gold prices; at the same time, marginal changes in the monetary policies of the European Central Bank and other major central banks will also disrupt the global real interest rate center and cause phased fluctuations in gold prices.
9. US dollar exchange rate risk. A stronger dollar index will directly suppress the price of gold denominated in dollars. The US economy is relatively more resilient than overseas economies, the return of global safe-haven funds to dollar assets, and the deterioration of fundamentals in non-US economies may all drive the dollar upward and weaken the relative appeal of gold. If the US dollar enters a strong trend range, the upward space for gold prices will be clearly constrained.
10. The central bank's purchase of funds falls short of the expected risk. The central bank's purchase of gold is the core supporting variable in this round of long-term demand for gold. If central banks in many countries shift their foreign exchange reserve allocation strategies, fiscal pressure increases, foreign exchange liquidity is tightened, the scale of gold purchases declines or even phased sales of gold, core demand support weakens, which will weaken the resilience of the bottom of gold prices. The central bank's gold purchase pace fluctuates at a quarterly level. When the continuation is lower than the market's optimistic assumptions, the market is prone to adjustments due to differences in expectations.